

Truth, The Body and Divinatory Astrology

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The trouble with having your Sun in Aries is that since you never stop moving, you're always just beginning...

When the organizers invited me to contribute to this conference, I pointed out that I could no longer be considered an historian of astrology. However, they were undeterred. So I will exploit their generous *carte blanche* in the hope that I can still contribute something, if not history-writing in the exemplary manner of the other contributions. But what might that contribution be? In my migration from historian of astrology to historiographer, perhaps the best I can hope for is philosophical gadfly, provoking practising historians to rethink aspects of their practice. (Not for nothing, but without in any way suggesting comparability, is one of my abiding heroes the late Paul Feyerabend.) This role frees me to engage in an enterprise – namely thinking and writing about history-writing – for which historians, on the whole, have neither the time, the resources nor the temperament. But even the most hardened empiricist would, I hope, hesitate to assert that what they do involves no guiding assumptions, or none which cannot be questioned and potentially changed with consequences for the better.

Just to be as clear as possible: my prescriptive and normative concern here is with a better practice of the history-writing of the *practice* of astrology. And what would that look like? Here one of my own guiding assumptions makes its appearance: it would be better if one could plausibly argue that it made more sense of the practice of astrologers, while allowing them the same degree of substantive positivity, in principle – that is, without turning their practice into essentially an absence or a negativity – as historians grant themselves. In other words, astrologers consider themselves to be doing astrology just as historians consider themselves to be doing history-writing; and just as the latter would not accept an essentially negating redescription of what they are doing, they should not decree that the former are actually doing something else. Or to put it still another way, the mode of the *explanandum* must be understood as applying reflexively to the *explanans*. (And here I might invoke the spirit of another continuing exemplar, E.P. Thompson; the condescension of posterity is nothing if not non-reflexive.)

With this as a criterion, it can be seen that the history-writing of astrology which I am criticizing depends on a double strategy in order to carry out a programme that is, at least by comparison, anachronistic (importing what we know now backwards in time despite its unavailability to actors then) and/or teleological (we know the truth now and they didn't, so we can judge their success or failure) – in both cases, the hallmark being a reliance on non-reflexive knowledge (accompanied by an uncritical attitude towards it).¹ That strategy comprises (1) an epistemological component, namely cognitive psychology, used to reconstrue

¹ See Patrick Curry, "The Historiography of Astrology: A Diagnosis and a Prescription", in K. von Stuckrad, G. Oestmann and D. Rutkin (eds.), *Horoscopes and History* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2005) 261-74; *idem*, "Astrology on Trial, and its Historians: Reflections on the Historiography of 'Superstition'", *Culture and Cosmos* 4:2 (2000) 47-56; *idem*, "Astrology in Early Modern England: The Making of a Vulgar Knowledge", in P. Rossi, S. Pumphrey and M. Slawinski (eds.), *Science, Culture and Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) 274-91.

astrological knowing as ‘belief’, which is then cashed out as cognitive error and thus false knowledge, i.e. an absence of knowledge; and (2) a social component, namely functionalism-structuralism, used to reduce astrological knowing to its putative socio-political functions, which also empties it of any truth in its own terms.²

Now an overview of recent developments in the history of astrology (which I am not going to try to supply) would have to take note of two encouraging trends in this context. One is a more frequent and visible disavowing, at least, of such a practice, and an effort to move away from it.³ The other and related one is a closer and more fruitful dialogue – led by the Warburg Institute – between historians of astrology and contemporary practitioners, usually non-academic, of ‘traditional’ astrologies: an innovation as promising as it is brave.⁴

However, to judge by comparison with a neighbouring field which has to meet similar challenges – namely, anthropology – the history of astrology still has a long way to go.⁵ My goal in this paper is largely to push and/or pull it somewhat further.⁶

To give you an idea of the distance involved, here is a recent statement by an historian of a closely related (and sometimes, I have argued, identical) activity, divination:

Whatever our ancient sources may claim about the greater powers that enabled it to work – gods, demons, the cosmos itself – divination is an utterly human art, behind which one can glimpse not only the rules that participants have developed for its engagement, but also the rules by which participants assume (or hope) that the world works.⁷

This statement occurs in the course of an otherwise excellent discussion of the field, but its condescension to its human subjects, with its concomitant refusal to take their experiences and ideas seriously, is quite unmistakable – driven, I would guess, by the fear of not being taken seriously in turn if one does so. (They are egregiously non- or pre-modern, after all.) As for reflexivity, I can’t help feeling it would be a step in the right direction if historians agreed to being described as engaged in an activity which is dictated by – or even merely reflects – rules they have devised plus “the rules by which [they] assume (or hope) that the world

² See Filip de Boeck & Rene Devisch, “Ndembu, Luunda and Yaka Divination Compared: From Representation and Social Engineering to Embodiment and Worldmaking”, *Journal pour Religion African* XXIV:2 (1994) 98-133:

http://www.era.anthropology.ac.uk/Era_Resources?Era/Divination?boeck.html (accessed 7.10.04).

³ E.g., Lauren Kassell, *Medicine and Magic in Elizabethan London*. Simon Forman: *Astrologer, Alchemist, and Physician* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005). For some reflections on the shortcomings of Anthony Grafton’s attempt (in practice) in *Cardano’s Cosmos: The Worlds and Work of a Renaissance Astrologer* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), see Curry, “Historiography” pp. 263-65, and Geoffrey Cornelius, “Review Essay: Cardano Incognito”, *Culture and Cosmos* 9:1 (2005) 99-111.

⁴ E.g. the forthcoming workshop on ancient astrology to be held at the Warburg Institute on 16-17 Feb. 2007. I first noted this kind of development in a review-essay, “The Messages of the Stars”, *The Times Literary Supplement*, No. 4818 (4 August 1995) 11.

⁵ For more discussion of this point, see Curry, “Historiography”. Another example of an otherwise useful work - in addition to the qualified instance of Grafton’s *Cardano’s Cosmos* - which suffers from the malaise identified here is Tamsyn Barton’s *Ancient Astrology* (London: Routledge, 1994).

⁶ There may be an affinity here with what Marc Augé calls “anthropological history”; *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (London: Verso, 1995).

⁷ Sarah Iles Johnston, “Introduction: Divining Divination”, in Sarah Iles Johnston and Peter T. Struck (eds.), *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination* (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 1-28: 10-11.

works.” But I doubt if it would be accepted as a self-description with quite the same casual ease it is here applied to diviners.

So, to begin again, let me ask: what is it that astrologers are doing when they do astrology – or rather, to delimit my subject more clearly, when they *practise horoscopy*? There is no one answer, of course, nor even one version of each possible answer. I want to concentrate on one which is consistent with the developments just mentioned, and seems to lead further in the same promising direction. You may think of it as an ethnographic and/or historical datum, if that helps. It is this: when astrologers interpret either the heavens directly or (more commonly) a symbolic representation thereof, they often experience that they are working *with* the stars or symbols, such that the outcome is a cooperative product between the astrologer’s human subjectivity and – and this is the key point – the subjectivity of the star or symbol. Also relevant here is the irreducible under-determination of that product by interpretive rules alone; no matter how detailed and sophisticated those rules, as supplied by the relevant tradition, there are always alternatives the choice between which is not dictated by a rule. (This is true much more broadly, of course, as per Wittgenstein’s point that the exhaustive use of a set of rules always requires a further set and so on, in an infinite regress.) This is often the point at which an interpretation, and the application of the rule needed to arrive there, reveals or suggests itself.

Conceptualization of such an experience (with its experiential consequences) has varied; for a very long time it was usually in terms of “some genius or spirit” (William Oughtred) or “a certain hidden power” (Cardano);⁸ more recently it has been in terms of a secularised “intuition”, as if that explained anything more. But what matters most here is the phenomenological or existential fact of *non- (or more-than-) human agency*: the agency of ‘things’ which, in what Latour nicely calls “the modern constitution”, are not supposed to have any.⁹

I believe this phenomenon can be found, without essentialization, in astrological practice from the very earliest times to the present. In recent years others and I have discussed it under the rubric of ‘divination’.¹⁰ Successive rationalizations – Ptolemaic-Aristotelian, Thomist, natural philosophical-scientific, and depth psychological – have failed to entirely obscure or eradicate it. Indeed, I would say that the only way to get rid of it entirely is to get rid of astrology itself (which is therefore precisely the programme of many contemporary ‘researchers’).¹¹ Of course, historians will tend to find it difficult to accept the idea of a millennia-long commonality of experience; but to deny its very possibility is surely to indulge in an essentialism of the fragments, especially when the phenomenon concerned can be conceived as rooted in a human nature which is much longer-standing and is no more infinitely malleable than it is transcendentally permanent and unchanging; and when it can be plausibly identified in different periods and places in a way that would, at least arguably, have been recognised by the actors themselves.

⁸ See Curry, “Historiography” 272.

⁹ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

¹⁰ Roy Willis and Patrick Curry, *Astrology, Science and Culture: Pulling Down the Moon* (Oxford: Berg, 2005); for an earlier and seminal account, see Geoffrey Cornelius, *The Moment of Astrology: Origins in Divination*, 2nd edn (Bournemouth: Wessex Astrologer, 2003). For a good recent overview of studies of the history of classical divination, see Johnson, “Introduction”.

¹¹ See Garry Phillipson, *Astrology in the Year Zero* (London: Flare, 2000); and Willis and Curry, *Astrology*, ch. 8.

Similarly, I have been accused on engaging on this account in a “theology of astrology” as supposedly opposed to an “historical or anthropological study”.¹² I hope it is already obvious that such a distinction is ultimately unsustainable – as if the latter were possible without effectively ‘theological’ assumptions, and the former could be identified and isolated in a way that did not to any significant extent apply reflexively to the putatively objective identifier. In any case, my construal of astrology as divination requires no assertion of timeless truth, but rather the suggestion that it offers an exciting and potentially fruitful way to approach astrology which reveals integral aspects of it hitherto obscured or even suppressed. Indeed, one corollary is that astrology itself can be viewed as a site of ongoing struggle between participatory (and specifically divinatory) discourses on the one hand and rationalist-realist ones on the other, the latter attempting – ultimately unsuccessfully but by no means without significant effects – to train, tame and control the former. And the line doesn’t just run between astrologers and their critics; it also divides the astrological community and tradition itself... and historians of astrology, in just the same way. That is, some historians too, to some degree, are committed to the same kind of programme of domestication whereas others (some consciously, others perhaps less so) are seeking, alongside other desiderata, ways to sustain the wildness and otherness which a divinatory approach reveals at the heart of astrology. But this way of putting the matter is potentially misleading, insofar as its proper context is not so much individual historians as the centre of gravity for the field as a whole.

From this point of view, the problem of interested inauthenticity which has long bedevilled astrology, so to speak, has equally haunted its scholarly study.¹³ And it turns on a version of ‘truth’ which is not only non-reflexive, as I have already suggested (that is, supposedly one thing for the astrologer and something else for the scholar) but, for historians of the first kind, conveniently inappropriate – indeed, actively inimical – to astrology so construed. (Indeed, I would argue, in line with what I take to be the best of science studies, that it also obscures what scholars do too.)

In any case, astrology *qua* divination entails a mode of knowledge – or rather, to borrow Wittgenstein’s famous term, form of life or (better) way of living,¹⁴ which includes but is not limited to knowing – that is signally different. It can be described in several ways, including *participatory* (invoking the pioneering late work of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl),¹⁵ *performative* (as distinct from descriptive), *pluralist* and (which is to say the same thing) *perspectival*. These are aspects I have already discussed in print and therefore, despite their importance, will not do so here – except to point out that by virtue of those characteristics, this mode cannot be encompassed by epistemological questions of representation or ‘belief’.¹⁶

Feyerabend was thus quite correct that astrology’s traditional enemies are not only better-informed but more perceptive than its contemporary ‘scientific’ critics.¹⁷ For what is the former’s charge of astrological demonism but a recognition, theistically construed and charged, of ineluctable divinatory participation – the prognostication as intervention, thus ‘magically’ contributing to bringing about what it supposedly predicts? And do these demons

¹² Review of Willis and Curry, *Astrology*, by Olav Hammer in *Aries* 5:1 (2005) 119-21.

¹³ Cf. Patrick Curry, “Divination, Enchantment and Platonism”, forthcoming in G. Cornelius, J. Lall and A. Voss (eds.), *The Imaginal Cosmos* (University of Kent, 2006).

¹⁴ With thanks to Garry Phillipson for pointing out this translation.

¹⁵ See the discussion in Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch.5.

¹⁶ See Willis and Curry, *Astrology*, and Curry, “Historiography”.

¹⁷ Paul Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society* (London: NLB, 1978) 91-6.

not entail a recognition of the crucial role of non-human agency I have just mentioned? Finally, is not the body absolutely central to this process?

The dimension I therefore want to foreground in this context is ontological rather than epistemological: specifically that of *animism*. Thus, astrology emerges as a tradition (diachronically) and ritual (synchronically) constituting and constituted by an ongoing dialogue with more-than-human powers, either the stars themselves or those for whom the stars are agents, in an attempt to discern their will and negotiate a favourable outcome in relation to one's own or others' human desires. This in turn entails a living cosmos of animate agencies and powers in which the ontological quanta are relations, with persons – by no means restricted to humans – as ongoing, unstable and incomplete foci thereof.¹⁸

You can appreciate, I'm sure, why taking such a world seriously might present some problems. Not only is it radically non-modern, it offends even unto the single God who spawned the split between Creator and created which Descartes deepened and formalized, along with its ultimately insoluble problems of representation (terminating in either solipicism or nihilism) and our related obsession with paradigms of production, and who haunts the most determinedly secular postmodern modernists today.

My treatment of animism is strongly influenced by a brilliant set of lectures given in Cambridge in 1998 by the anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, in which it is defined as an ontology in which relations between humans and non-humans are themselves social, in contrast to 'our' (dominant) naturalism, where they are themselves natural.¹⁹ Rather than the latter's emphasis on production-creation, animism is about exchange-transformation. And it entails another demanding (for 'us') inversion: culture-spirituality is *universal*, hence the animism, with its participation, etc.; whereas nature-physicality is *particular*. The second of these twins results in (and is a result of) what Viveiros de Castro calls *perspectivism*. It should by no means be confused with relativism, however; for the latter assumes a single universal nature which is apprehended differently by different epistemological actors, but perspectivism consist not of representations of objects by subjects but in relations of subjects to subjects, which thus returns us to ontology (and animism): "all beings see ('represent') the world in the *same* way – what changes is the *world* that they see."²⁰

To this extent, then, when an historian (or any other observer) arrives at an explanation of an astrologer's astrological judgement (in the sense appropriate to judicial astrology) which is predicated on the assumption that it is empirically false or even falsifiable in a way which exhausts its truth-value – or even that propositional truth-value is the fundamental benchmark in this context – and that it is therefore licit to supply a non-reflexive cognitive and/or functional explanation, that historian has failed to recognise that he or she and the astrologer's disagreement is not "in opinions but in form of life."²¹ Or, to put it bluntly: *contra* the historian's assumption, they are not engaging with the same worlds. And since the *explanans* should precede and reflexively encompass the *explanandum*, rather than the latter non-reflexively and, as it were, imperialistically appropriating the former, the only solution – if the

¹⁸ See Graham Harvey, *Animism* (London: C. Hurst, 2006).

¹⁹ "Cosmological Perspectivism in Amazonia and Elsewhere", 4 lectures delivered 17 Feb. – 10 March at the Dept. of Social Anthropology. See also his "Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism", *Journal of the Rpyal Anthropological Institute*, n.s., 4:3 (1998) 469-88 and "Exchanging Perspectives: The Transformation of Subjects into Objects in Amerindian Cosmologies", *Common Knowledge* 10:3 (2004) 463-84.

²⁰ Viveiros de Castro, 4 lectures, 33; emphasis in original.

²¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), passage 241.

historian wishes to engage with and thus access the same world as that of the astrologer – is for him or her to “allow the [astrological] material to touch the observer *as truth for the observer*.”²² Or this, rather, is where the solution starts; the next step is the hard work of revising our inappropriate starting-concepts accordingly. And all this while keeping open the lines of communication with the scholarly enterprise as understood by the distinctly non-astrological academy! (The solution in this respect, it seems to me, is ultimately to understand, and present, the astrological and the scholarly projects as two distinct ones which are, however, equally participatory, performative and perspectival *in their ways*.)

The anthropologist Martin Holbraad (partly inspired by Viveiros de Castro) is well on the way to exploring and mapping just this project in relation to divination. His work promises to be definitive, at least for some time to come. I shall not try to summarize it here except to say that, recognizing the radical alterity of diviner’s (ontological) concepts vis-à-vis our (epistemological) assumptions, he is developing an appropriate non-representational concept of “motive logic” as an alternative to merely enunciating conditions of native error.²³ To quote from a lecture Holbraad also recently gave in Cambridge,

Cubans [read: astrologers] have oracles. We don’t. We don’t have oracles mainly because we don’t believe in them. So if they do that must be because they believe in them. This application of excluded middle would be fine, were it not for the fact that the assumption that the only way of having oracles is by ‘believing in them’ were not a baseless projection, due to a lack of ethnographic imagination combined with a remarkable self-confidence that our own conceptual framework is rich enough to describe that of all others.

So, for example, ‘you are bewitched’ is not a predicate that is true or not of me:

it is a meaning that is being related so as to redefine me. ...To ask whether such a shift is ‘true or false’ is fundamentally to misunderstand the ontological character of the transformation, by confusing it with the epistemological question of how the shift may be ascertained.

...treating the truths that oracles pronounce as representational is a category mistake. Oracles turn on an alternative concept of truth, namely that of inventive definition.²⁴

But I shall leave this line of thought here because I want to return to Viveiros de Castro and the issue of perspectivism, with its cultural universalism but natural particularism; and because this (finally) is where the body comes in. For “a perspective is not a representation...because representations are a property of the mind or spirit, whereas the point of view is located in the body”; the body, not precisely physiologically speaking, but as “an assemblage of affects or ways of being that constitute a *habitus*”, is the site of perspectives.²⁵

Now at the very least, this point – that is, the central role of bodily desires, dispositions, capacities and affects – ought to throw into radical question any attempt to

²² Geoffrey Cornelius, “Verity and the Question of Primary and Secondary Scholarship in Astrology”, in Nicholas Campion, Patrick Curry and Michael York (eds.), *Astrology and the Academy* (Bristol: Cinnabar Books, 2004) 103-113: 108; emphasis in original.

²³ Martin Holbraad, “Gauging Necessity: Ifà Oracles and Truth in Havana”, *Mana* 9:2 (2003) 39-77. (References here are to the English MS. of which the published paper is a Portuguese translation.)

²⁴ From “Defining Anthropological Truth”, a paper given in Cambridge, 24.9.04, pp. 2, 6; my emphasis.

²⁵ Viveiros de Castro, 4 lectures, 36-37.

construe divinatory and/or astrological knowledge as essentially propositional and empirical, and with it, the basis of the structuralist-functionalist programme as a whole. Yet here is surely also a conundrum for my thesis; for Viveiros de Castro uses this point to elucidate the differences and commonalities between human and non-human persons, and astrologers and scholars alike are surely equally human. But there is sometimes this difference: recall that perspectivism entails exchange, or in other words, transformation, defined as “an instantaneous shift of perspectives” which “occurs at the meeting of two perspectives.... *not a process but a relation*. Nothing ‘happened’, but everything has changed.”²⁶ This, I suggest, is just what happens when the star or symbol engages the astrologer – and if there is a client present, her or him – in the act of interpretation.

Two interesting points then follow which deserve more consideration than I can begin to offer here. One is that such an astrologer is, *ipso facto*, engaged in shamanism. The shaman – including the diviner *qua* shaman – is one whose task and skill (to whatever degree) is to move between worlds – and specifically, to leave the human world for another one *and return* – in order to negotiate with non-human powers for the benefit (usually healing) of individuals and the community as a whole.

The other point is that the bodily *habitus* of the shaman, and shamanic astrologer, should differ significantly from the non-shaman (whether astrologer or scholar). I must confess that I have no idea how to flesh out this assertion, if you’ll pardon the expression. But I draw some comfort, and indications, from other anthropological work: for example, James Fernandez’s remark that “the best diviners are ones who are exceptionally well tuned in to the *primary processes* where so many of our problems lie.”²⁷ And Filip de Boeck and René Devische – who concur that divination does not mimic or model a world (*pace* Victor Turner) but “rather makes a world” – also observe that it “constitutes a space in which cognitive structures are transformed and new *relations* are generated in and between the human body (senses, emotions), the social body and the cosmos.” Accordingly, they argue, “the cognitive, meaning-centered level in Turner’s analysis needs to be balanced by a more praxiological dimension, in which the emphasis is put on agency, enforcement and worldmaking rather than on structure and social engineering.... Attention should be devoted to divination as act rather than fact.”²⁸ Is it not quite possible that in this process, the vital importance of embodiment – not so much the mind in the body but (to borrow Mark Johnson’s title) the body in the mind²⁹ – has been unduly neglected? And that insofar as ‘act’ should be interpreted as ultimately referring not to act in the abstract but specific instances, that the specific (embodied) diviner matters and – by the same token – makes a difference?

Another implication, it seems to me, is that it is possible to view the entire complex structure of astrological tradition(s) concerning humour, temperament, disposition, affect and so on as a symbolic recapitulation of this very existential fact, pointing, with admirable reflexivity, to the practice of astrology itself – its abilities as well constraints, its desires, needs and perspectives – as irreducibly rooted in the body.

²⁶ Viveiros de Castro, 4 lectures, 62-3; emphasis in original.

²⁷ James W. Fernandez, “Afterword”, in Philip M. Peek (ed.), *African Divination Systems: Ways of Knowing* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1991) 213-21: 220.

²⁸ Filip de Boeck & René Devisch, “Ndembu, Luunda and Yaka Divination Compared: From Representation and Social Engineering to Embodiment and Worldmaking”, *Journal pour Religion African* XXIV:2 (1994) 98-133; http://www.era.anthropology.ac.uk/Era_Resources/Era/Divination/boeck.html (accessed 7.10.04); emphasis in the original.

²⁹ Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

Such a recognition might be seen as opening the door (whether intentionally or not) to a plausible ‘physical’ theory, centred on neurophysiology, chronobiology, geomagnetic fields and circadian and other cycles, as the ‘basis’ of much astrological theory and thus, at least to some extent, practice.³⁰ This development would amount to a rebirth of natural astrology – until, that is, it was appropriated (just as lunar tides were) by science. Now properly understood, it seems to me, a neo-natural astrology could no more replace divinatory astrology, or the divinatory dimension of astrological practice, than its premodern version; practice is inherently underdetermined by theory. By the same token, no such theory, no matter how sophisticated, could close the gap in principle constituted by its own lack of self-interpretation and self-application. To that extent, then, its use too could be called to account in the terms (lack of reflexivity, inappropriate reliance on epistemology and representation, etc.) I have outlined.

There is little doubt that such a calling to account would be necessary, because given the place of astrology in the modern mainstream intellectual *mentalité*, the temptation to convert science into scientism would be considerable. Such an unfortunate move would also result in perpetuating our parochial naturalism (falsely assumed to be universal, and covertly enforced universally), with its the simple-minded dualism of a unitary, self-identical body/nature and a multiple, discursive mind/culture.

The truth – that is, a richer and saner truth – is, I suspect, that the body and nature is itself the very site of pluralism, alterity and metaphor.³¹ Metaphor, of course, is at the very heart of astrology. Furthermore, Ricoeur has pointed out that fresh metaphors (as opposed to dead ones, as in clichés) create new meanings which give rise to new insights; and that integral to this process is defiance of a linchpin of rationalist-realist epistemology – but by no means a self-evident ontological truth! – namely the Aristotelian logical ‘rule’ of contradiction.³² (To put it crudely, just as Achilles both is and is not a lion, John both is and is not a Leo.)

Finally, this situation seems to me virtually indistinguishable from Holbraad’s “inventive definition”. And what is enlivened or invented, by and for astrologers and/or their clients, is not only linguistic but personal and existential meaning. But that is a subject for another time and place, if not world.

³⁰ Currently in development, especially by Graham Douglas. See, e.g., “Cosmic Influences: A New Proposal”, *Correlation* 20:1(2001) 56 – 64, also available at <http://CURA.free.fr/xv/14doug1.html>; “Some Unexpected Solar Patterns in the Gauquelin Data: Time for researchers to look at Early Astrological Writings”, *Correlation* 23:2 (2006) 24 – 46; “Towards a New Natural Astrology: A Reply to Garry Phillipson” forthcoming in *Correlation* (2006).

³¹ In addition to Johnson, *Body*, see, e.g., Jerry H. Gill, *Merleau-Ponty and Metaphor* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1991) – with thanks, respectively, to Graham Douglas and John Wadsworth for bringing these two books to my attention.

³² Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (London: RKP, 1978).